Public Policy Against Religion: Doubting Thomas by Seeburger, Richard H.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 1
1-15-1984
Public Policy Against Religion: Doubting Thomas
Richard H. Seeburger
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. Seeburger Public Policy Against Religion: Doubting Thomas , 11 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1984)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol11/iss2/1
Public Policy Against Religion:
Doubting Thomas
RICHARD H. SEEBURGER*
In free exercise cases, the Supreme Court has adopted a least restrictive
alternative test in an attempt to maximize protection for religiously moti-
vated practices. Because the least restrictive alternative test only consid-
ers the importance of the governmental interest and the availability of
alternative means to accomplish those interests, thereby ignoring the im-
portance of the burdened religious activity to the individual and the de-
gree of burden on religious activity, all religious interests are treated
equally when asserted against a governmental interest. Under such an in-
flexible and brittle test, the Supreme Court has recently denied religious
claims which had previously been recognized. The author argues that only
a test which considers all aspects of a religious claim affords permanent
and maximum protection of religious interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
A constitutional liberty is the right of an individual to be ex-
empt from a statute that penalizes, burdens, or disadvantages cer-
tain conduct or beliefs. It is immaterial if the statute specifically
addresses the conduct or belief, in which case the statute is inva-
lid on its face, or is of general application, in which case the stat-
ute is invalid as applied. In either case, in passing on a
constitutional challenge, the Court must evaluate the individual's
* A.B., Dickinson College, 1957; J.D., Harvard University, 1960; LL.M.,
Harvard University, 1964. Professor of Law and Associate Dean of University of
Pittsburgh School of Law.
assertion that he should not be subject to the statute, evaluate
the government's interest in enforcing the statute, and somehow
resolve the conflict. The very nature of such an evaluation by the
Court suggests a process that is sensitive, discriminating, and
fact-oriented. The Court is called upon to assess the relative im-
portance of the government's application of the statute to the par-
ticular claimant, the availability of alternative, less burdensome
means to effectuate the same ends, the degree of the burden on
the claimant's interest, and the importance of that individual
interest.
When the asserted constitutional liberty interest is founded
upon the free exercise clause of the first amendment, the individ-
ual claims that he is different from others because of his religion
and thus entitled to an exemption that others with different reli-
gious beliefs cannot assert. In such cases, the balancing test de-
scribed above is likely to invite two criticisms. First, evaluation of
both the degree of the burden and the importance of the individ-
ual interest places the Court in the unseemly position of deciding
what actually constitutes a religion and its necessary practices.
Secondly, as a criticism applicable to "balancing" in general, the
Court appears to make policy decisions and to substitute its views
for those of the legislature and drafters of the Constitution in a
fact-oriented opinion decided without regard to any general prin-
ciples and with relatively little precedential value.
For whatever reason, the Supreme Court has moved completely
away from anything resembling a balancing approach in free ex-
ercise cases. In what appeared to be an attempt to maximize pro-
tection for religiously motivated practices, the Court in Thomas v.
Review Board' finally settled on the least restrictive alternative
approach for all types of burdens 2 challenged under the free ex-
ercise clause. In Thomas, the Court awarded relief to an individ-
ual whose pursuit of a religious practice made him ineligible for a
public benefit. The Court felt constrained to follow an earlier case
where, as in Thomas, the burden was the denial of unemployment
compensation. 3
This least restrictive alternative test purports to focus on only
the former two elements of the balancing test; the relative impor-
tance of the governmental interest and the availability of alterna-
tive means to accomplish those governmental ends, including an
1. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
2. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (violation of free exercise clause by
denial of unemployment benefits to one who was fired because her religious be-
liefs would not permit her to work on Saturdays) [hereinafter cited as Sherbert].
See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text for discussion of Sherbert.
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exemption for the claimant from the general regulation. Two
cases decided subsequent to Thomas, however, denied a religious
claim which had been previously recognized by the Court4 and
suggest that the apparent arrival of a new settled approach which
maximizes protection of religious interests was illusory. This new
unsettledness is especially curious in light of the fact that all of
the opinions were written by Chief Justice Burger.
This article will suggest that the certainty promised by Thomas
does not exist, because it cannot exist. The same test cannot be
applied to both specific prohibitions of religious practices and the
indirect financial burdens upon members of particular religious
groups. The two situations are completely distinguishable. The
Thomas approach refuses to weigh or balance the religious claim
advanced, thereby reducing all religious claims to a lowest com-
mon denominator when measured against an asserted secular
purpose. The Court's approach further treats claims of religious
privilege and claims of personal autonomy equally, thus jeopard-
izing our religious diversity. Additionally, the Court seems un-
able to assess the importance of the governmental interest
asserted.
II. FORMER APPROACHES TO EVALUATING RELIGIOUS CLAIMS
I
Religion was of great importance during Revolutionary times.5
The protection of the free exercise of religion and the prevention
4. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Bob Jones Univ. ]; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Lee].
Bob Jones Univ. involved the right of parents to send their children to a reli-
gious school in' satisfaction of compulsory attendance laws, one of the first rights
ever recognizea by the Court in this area. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (Oregon law requiring the education of children in public schools vio-
lated the parents' liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education of
their children). Intervening cases had left the right unimpaired. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory attendance laws beyond eighth grade vio-
lated free exelcise clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state aid to
religious primary and secondary schools violated establishment clause). However,
in Bob Jones Univ., the Court, purporting to apply a least restrictive alternative
test, upheld a burden on the right to choose a religious education-the loss of
favorable tax treatment.
In Lee, the Court, again using a least restrictive alternative test, rejected the
claim of individuals of the Amish faith for an exemption from the social security
system, despite an earlier decision in Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
which allowed Amish parents to withdraw their children from public schools after
the eighth grade.
5. See A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1950).
of a federally established church were given high priority.6 Given
the widespread and diverse religious practices, a significant vol-
ume of litigation involving free exercise might have been ex-
pected to reach the Supreme Court of the United States. That so
few cases have reached the Court may be attributable to the sen-
sitivity of legislatures and law enforcement officials to such con-
cerns. However, the Supreme Court, in those few cases that have
reached it, has not tread so lightly.
Where particular conduct or activity is singled out for sanctions
or burdens for non-secular (religiously discriminatory) reasons,
the regulation should be per se invalid. The free exercise clause
means nothing if it is not a prohibition against disparate treat-
ment or special burdens on personal practices solely because
they are religious.
However, where the regulation is cast in secular terms, the
problem has been intractable. 7 Originally, the Court attempted to
draw a distinction between belief and action.8 'No distinction,
however, was drawn between actions that were part of a worship
service and those conducted in everyday life but dictated by reli-
gious belief. The consequence of such an approach was to protect
the belief absolutely, but the practice not at all.9 The individual
was subject to regulation without reference to the motive for his
action. Until Bob Jones University v. United States10 in 1983, there
were no Supreme Court cases contributing to modern doctrinal
development where the sanctioned or burdened activity was itself
dictated by religious belief, as opposed to the sanctioning of con-
duct which indirectly burdened other religiously motivated
6. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. I; see also ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION passim (2d ed.
Philadelphia 1836) (lst ed. Philadelphia 1830).
7. Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (curricular design of public
school invalid where evolution not taught).
8. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious claim by mem-
bers of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints [Mormons] was not
permitted as a defense to federal prosecution for the practice of polygamy in
United States territories no matter how important a religious exercise).
9. See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L.
REV. 1 (1961). There is an added irony in that contemporary first; amendment doc-
trine protects beliefs quite independently of any religious claim. The free exercise
clause is thus superfluous under an approach that relies on a belief/action dichot-
omy. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) ("Live Free or Die" slogan on
New Hampshire auto license plates may be taped over); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11 (1966) (public employment may not be conditioned on beliefs); Torasco v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (public office may not be conditioned on beliefs);
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (free speech considerations compel
that objecting student be excused from compulsory flag salute exercises in public
schools).
10. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
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conduct."
Modern Supreme Court doctrine has concerned itself with the
indirect burden case. In such a case, the prohibition or burdening
of a particular kind of conduct or religious practice, which, al-
though not religiously dictated, is nonetheless indirectly bur-
dened by the governmental statute. The burden is usually of a
financial nature, either through the withholding of a benefit or the
imposition of a sanction.12 The belief/action test was abandoned
and a new balancing approachl3 manifested itself clearly in the
Sunday Closing Law Cases.14 In those cases, Orthodox Jewish
merchants claimed that because their religious beliefs prevented
them from working on Saturday, the statute preventing them
from operating their retail establishments on Sunday seriously
impaired their' ability to earn a livelihood. They did not claim,
however, that their religious beliefs dictated that their stores be
open on Sunday.
The plurality opinion stated that regulations advancing secular
goals that indirectly burdened religious observances were valid
unless alternative means would not impose such a burden.i5 It
was not clear Ito the plurality that such alternatives existed, given
the increased Idifficulties of enforcement and the possible increase
of commercial noise that granting an exemption might create.' 6
11. The Court had refused to hear argument or write an opinion when
presented with tl~e opportunity in cases where the conduct was allegedly part of a
worship service. ISee Town v. State ex tel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), appeal
dismissed and ce-t. denied, 449 U.S. 803 (1980) (state has compelling interest in re-
stricting use of marijuana which overrides free exercise interests of persons claim-
ing use as part of religious ceremony); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) (conviction
under an ordinance prohibiting "handling" of poisonous reptiles upheld against
religious exercise claim).
12. E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing law made it
more difficult for Orthodox Jew who would not work on Saturday to earn a
livelihood).
13. A balancing test involves consideration of the importance of the religious
practice. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishmen and Doctrinal Devel-
opment Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L REV. 1381 (1967);
Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE LJ. 593
(1964).
14. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In a companion case, Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961), the statute challenged was titled "Obser-
vance of the Lord's Day Act." The Court upheld the statute holding that the legis-
lators' motive was irrelevant. Id. at 630. Contra Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (curricular design of public school invalid where evolution not taught).
15. 366 U.S. at 607.
16. The deference to leeislative convenience was in part caused by the desire
The scope of review, while an improvement over the belief/action
test, was still too relaxed to guarantee serious protection against
indirect burdens to religious interests.
A dramatic new direction was announced in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 17 the first of the unemployment compensation cases. The in-
direct financial burden in Sherbert was the withholding of a public
benefit. The state had determined that a Jehovah's Witness who
would not work on Saturday was not "available for work" as re-
quired by the state's unemployment compensation statute and
thus not eligible for unemployment compensation. The Supreme
Court characterized this particular burden as "less direct" than
that involved in the Sunday Closing Law Cases. 18 Rather than be-
ing deferential to the state's choice of means, the Court cast the
burden on the state to demonstrate that there were no alternative
means that would not infringe upon the asserted rights'9-a bur-
den which is next to impossible to meet.20
Whether the Court had finally settled on a new approach re-
mained uncertain, however, because its least restrictive alterna-
tive language was unnecessary to the decision. The
unemployment compensation scheme provided a possible exemp-
tion for Sunday worshipers 21 therefore, the case could have been
decided on grounds of religious discrimination. Furthermore, the
exemption for Sunday worshipers suggested that the state's inter-
est in its rigid view of the meaning of the requirement "available
for work" was something less than compelling.22
The potential universality of the technique announced in Sher-
bert was put in question nine years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 23
a case which came closer to the more direct burden of the Sunday
Closing Law Cases. 24 In Yoder, the Court affirmed the reversal of
to avoid a state-conducted inquiry into the sincerity of religious beliefs. Id. at 609.
In contrast, the dissent took a more non-evaluative, burden-shifting approach:
"We are not told that those States [which grant exemptions] are significantly nois-
ier, or that their police are significantly more burdened. .. " Id. at 614-15 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The opinion was written by Justice Brennan, the dis-
senter in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 597, 610 (1961); see supra note 16.
18. 374 U.S. at 408.
19. Id. at 407.
20. See Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal
Protection, 48 Mo. L. REV. 587, 617-19 (1983).
21. 374 U.S. at 406.
22. See id. at 403. Justice Brennan borrowed this idea from the free speech
case of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). This "less than compelling"
evaluation did not appear in his Sunday Closing Law Cases dissent. See Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). For discussion of Braunfeld, see
supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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convictions of Amish parents who had refused to comply with the
law subjecting their children to compulsory education beyond the
eighth grade. !The opinion by Chief Justice Burger adopted a bal-
ancing approach, although one not as deferential to the state as
that in the Stinday Closing Law Cases. 25 The approach, however,
was not a full'fiedged balancing test. The state's interest in one or
two years of schooling beyond the eighth grade 26 was not strongly
defended in terms of content and received no support from the
Court. Furthermore, there was no discussion of how the state
might pursue its interest in the further education of students
apart from mandating full-time attendance at school.
The uncertainty over the appropriate test to be employed in
various factual situations became apparent in McDaniel v. Paty, 27
a case involving the disqualification of clergy from serving as
state legislators. The eight Justices involved in the decision, al-
though agre'ing that the facial discrimination was itself invalid,
could not produce a majority opinion as to why. The major disa-
greement was over the effect of Torasco v. Watkins, 28 which
struck down a requirement that all Maryland public office holders
take an oath I declaring their belief in God. In the plurality opin-
ion, Chief Justice Burger held that Torasco was a "belief' case
and thus not! applicable to the instant "status" case. 29 Instead, he
relied on Sherbert to place the burden of justification on the state.
"'[T]o condition the availability of benefits [including access to
the ballot] upon the appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal
principle of [his] religious faith [by surrendering his religiously
impelled mixistry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his]
constitutional liberties.' "30 Neither the state's nor the American
experience provided any support for the state's assertion that
clergy would be less faithful to their oaths of office or less careful
of anti-estlablishment interests than their unordained
25. 406 U.S. at 214. Justice Brennan joined Justice White's concurring opinion,
id. at 237, which also expressly used a balancing test. Coupled with the fact that
the Chief Justie was not on the Court when Sherbert was decided, this decision
cast further doubt on the universality of the least restrictive alternative approach.
26. WIs. STAT. § 118.15(1) (a) (West 1969) set school age requirements of 7 to 16
years but not grade level requirements. The statute was subsequently revised to
comply with Y6der. SeeWis. STAT. § 118.15 (West Supp. 1983).
27. 435 U.S2 618 (1978).
28. 367 U.S' 488 (1961).
29. 435 U.S. at 626-27.
30. Id. at 626 (Quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
counterparts. 31
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, however, thought
the facial discrimination was in itself enough to invalidate the
statute under Torasco.3 2 Noting that the statute was neither im-
plemented by religiously neutral means nor in furtherance of an
avowedly secular purpose, Justice Brennan concluded that not
only was the balancing test of Yoder inapplicable, but the consid-
eration of any less restrictive means under Sherbert was also in-
appropriate. 33 Justice Brennan further stated that the interest in
preventing those more intensely involved in religion from inject-
ing sectarian goals and policies into the lawmaking process itself
raised establishment clause questions.34
III. THE ADOPTION OF THE LEAST REsTRICTIvE ALTERNATIVE TEST
As late as 1980, writers asserted that the free exercise cases
should be examined under a balancing test.3 5 Regardless of
whether this was a fair characterization of the preceding cases,
that assertion would not live out the 1980 term during which
Thomas 36 was decided.
In Thomas, the Chief Justice applied Justice Brennan's Sher-
bert37 language. However, unlike Sherbert, the facts of Thomas
did not present the option of deciding the case on religious dis-
crimination grounds or on the basis of a weak governmental inter-
est.38 Petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness, was transferred from his
job when the rolling foundry where he had worked was closed.39
Subsequent to the closing of the foundry, the only position re-
maining open for petitioner with the employer was in a depart-
ment that fabricated turrets for military tanks4o from the sheet
steel that may have been produced in the rolling foundry in which
31. Id. at 629.
32. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 634-35.
34. Id. at 636. The same argument is raised in situations where religious ex-
emptions are granted by statute. For instance, it has been argued that had the un-
employment compensation statute in Sherbert been written by the legislature to
provide for special benefits for Sabbatarians (which Justice Brennan held the free
exercise clause mandated) the establishment clause would be violated. See
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 690-92 (1980).
35. Choper, supra note 34, at 674; Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 355 (1980).
36. Thomas v. Board of Review, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 17-22 and accompa-
nying text.
38. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
39. 450 U.S. at 710.
40. Id.
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petitioner hac1 previously worked.41
Claiming his religious principles, which were not compelled by
the creed,42 prevented him from working directly on weapons, he
asked for a transfer. When none was forthcoming, he quit and
filed for unemployment compensation. 43 The state denied his
claim stating that "good cause" for terminating employment must
be "job relatIed and objective in character"" in order to comply
with the requirements for obtaining unemployment compensation
benefits. The court below held that any indirect burden on a free
exercise right was justified because of the state's interest in the
integrity of its unemployment compensation fund.45
Chief Justice Burger first concluded that the petitioner's rea-
sons for refusing em'ployment were religious rather than per-
sonal. 6 Therefore, because a religious belief was burdened by
the denial of benefits,47 the Court held that the state was obliged
to show that it had chosen the "least restrictive" means of achiev-
ing some compelling state interest.4 8 In dismissing the state's as-
serted interest in avoiding unemployment, protecting against the
burden on the unemployment compensation fund if persons were
permitted to leave jobs for personal reasons, and avoiding de-
tailed probing by employers into job applicants' religious be-
liefs, 49 the Court found no evidence that individuals in
petitioner's position would create any significant problem.5 0
The balancing test appeared to be gone. It had been replaced
by a universal test that was next to impossible for a state to
meet.5 ' Although reaction to the case has been limited,52 at least
41. Id. at 711.
42. Evidence was introduced below that the belief was personal. Id. at 715.
43. Id. at 710.
44. Id. at 712-13.
45. Id. at 713. The Court also asserted that awarding such benefits would vio-
late the establishment clause, id., a claim rejected in Sherbert.
46. The fact that he was "struggling" with his beliefs or that they were not
shared by other members of his faith was not fatal. 450 U.S. at 715.
47. Id. at 716-17. According to the Court, the state's forcing the choice between
following the precepts of one's religion or forfeiting a benefit is the same kind of
burden as imposing a fine for Saturday worship. Id. at 717 (quoting Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
48. 450 U.S! at 718.
49. Id. at 718-19.
50. Id. at 719. The imp]ication is that the more widespread a religious practice
is the less constitutional protection is available.
51. An impossible test is an unworkable one. The experience of the same test
in equal protection is described in Seeburger, supra note 20.
one commentator has criticized the decision both because of its
factual analysis and its doctrine.5 3 However, it is the least restric-
tive alternative test finally adopted in Thomas that is the focus of
this article, rather than its particular result or holding.
As is witnessed by the two free exercise cases decided since
Thomas,54 this technique, much more than a balancing test,55
lends itself to insensitivity of religious concerns. The test recog-
nizes no distinctions in the degrees, directness, or types of bur-
dens and is insensitive to differences in governmental policy. The
most incidental inconvenience suffered by an individual in pur-
suit of a unique, arguably religious personal conviction, when bur-
dened by even a critical government interest, is treated in the
exact manner as a widely shared traditional religious practice
when burdened by a relatively minor governmental interest. Gov-
ernment policy is trivialized and personal predilection exalted.
Sooner or later religious interests must receive short shrift under
such a test. It has been sooner rather than later.5 6
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE TEST
Any challenge to state activity on free exercise grounds elicits
at least three possible inquiries: (1) when is the exercise or belief
"religious"?; (2) what constitutes a "burden"?; and (3) how does
the court identify a "compelling" state interest?5 7
The first question, when is the belief or exercise "religious,"
presents long standing problems not unique to the least restric-
52. It was noted in only six law reviews: Note, Thomas v. Review Board- How
Far is the Supreme Court Willing to Go?, 10 OHio N.U. L. REV. 193 (1983); Note,
Constitutional Law: The Religion Clauses-A Free Rein to Free Exercise?, 11 STET-
SON L. REV. 386 (1982); Note, Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: A Com-
parison of Thomas v. Review Board and Title VII Cases, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 843
(1982); Note, Unemployment Benefits and the Religion Clauses. A Recurring Con-
flic 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 585 (1982); 22 SANTA CLARA L REV. 235 (1982); 59 U. DET.
J. URB. L. 217 (1982). The case was generally praised for its protection of religious
interests.
53. Professor Garvey delivers a convincing attack on two fronts. First, the fail-
ure to pay compensation does not burden the free exercise of religion and second,
to treat it as a restriction on liberty at all is to do violence to the notions of equal-
ity underlying the establishment clause. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the
Religion Clauses, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 193. On the latter point, see also Choper,
supra note 34.
54. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
55. Contra Note, supra note 35, at 355-62.
56. The least restrictive alternative principle might be likened to cutting the
Gordian knot. It presents a quick resolution to the problem at hand at the ex-
pense of having no useful rope left over.
57. Implicit in the statement of this test is the notion that a non-compelling
state interest pursued by the least restrictive means which nonetheless burdens
religion is per se invalid.
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tive alternative test. The belief/action distinction avoided them.5 8
The balancing test struggled with them. 59 It is clear, however,
that a "personal philosophical choice" not "rooted in religion" is
not protected by the free exercise clause.60 The claimant must in
fact hold to the belief or no interest is invaded.61 The belief, how-
ever, need not be shared.62
Notwithstanding these considerations, government determina-
tions, through the courts or otherwise, of what is and what is not
a religion for purposes of free exercise protection in and of itself
raises serious questions under the establishment clause.63 Under
any test, however, a sincerely held belief inducing action that
foregoes a benefit is likely to be treated sympathetically.64 In any
event, no religious claim has ever been rejected by the Supreme
Court on the grounds that it did not involve "religion."
The second inquiry, what is an unconstitutional burden, is also
effectively abandoned as a factor by the least restrictive alterna-
tive test. Deferential treatment based on the kind of burden, let
58. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For discussion of Reyn-
olds, see supra note 8.
59. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text. Notwithstanding the state's concession or the finding below
on this point, the Court made its own determination, which in that particular case
happily was not remotely problematic. For a fuller discussion on the development
from Braunfeld through Sherbert to Yoder, see Marcus, The Forum of Conscience:
Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1220-30
(1973).
60. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). Such beliefs are, how-
ever, protected against compulsory expression of ideas. See cases cited, supra
note 9.
61. The fact that the claimant is "struggling" with the belief or having some
difficulty articulating it is not fatal to the claim. 450 U.S. at 715.
62. "[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire
whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the com-
mands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."
Id. at 716. See also Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Un-
derstanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978).
It is not to be read that tenets of the faith must be shared or based on scripture,
although "[olne can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exer-
cise Clause .. " Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
63. See generally, Choper, supra note 34; Garvey, supra note 53; see also Jus-
tice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 418, and concurring opinion
in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (reaching constitutional issue on
statutory grant of exemption from combatant military service for persons consci-
entiously opposed to war because of religious training and beliefs and stating that
Congress cannot draw the line between religious, theistic or non-theistic, and sec-
ular beliefs).
64. E.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
alone its degree, is foreclosed. Three types of possible burdens
exist: burdens or prohibitions on an activity designated as a reli-
gious exercise, such as the act of worship;65 burdens or prohibi-
tions on acts outside the worship service deemed compelled or
banned by the faith66 and individual desires to perform a prohib-
ited or burdened act, whether or not compelled by religious belief,
in order to facilitate religious practices, when such an act would
make the individual unavailable for a particular benefit.67 The
only possible latitude available in this inquiry is the Court's state-
ment in Thomas, made without discussion or apparent considera-
tion, that the benefit withheld (the burden) must be
"important."68
In determining the third inquiry, the importance of a govern-
mental interest in religion cases, the Court's performance hereto-
fore has been erratic at best.69 For example, the government's
interest in protecting children from harmful influences can pre-
vent a girl under 18 from selling literature in a public place as her
religion demands, 70 but it cannot compel her attendance at a pub-
hc school7l or at any school past the eighth grade.7 2 The govern-
ment, in its desire not to subsidize personal choices, may
withhold educational,73 but not unemployment benefits.74 Assum-
ing an important interest can be identified with some objectivity,
the least restrictive alternative test contemplates granting individ-
ual exemptions. Where the interest is in saving money, the gov-
ernment must show that extending the benefit would cost more
65. The Eucharist in some Christian sects compels minors to drink alcoholic
beverages. See Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 803 (1980); see also supra note 11.
66. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For discussion of Reyn-
olds, see supra note 8.
67. E.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707.
68. Id. at 717. This may suggest that the distinctions made between Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (hearing required prior to garnishment of
wages because of their importance) and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(no hearing for termination of social security disability payments required) will be
observed. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required prior to
termination of welfare benefits). The difficulty is that the "importance" does not
refer to any adjudicative fact or any attribute of the claimant, but rather it seems
to be a legislative fact. Thus in Sniadach, the claimant whose "important" wages
were garnished could have been the owner of the company who received only a
nominal wage, but lived on profits and investments.
69. For a discussion of the identification of important governmental objectives
under an equal protection analysis, see Seeburger, supra note 20, at 609-10.
70. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
71. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
72. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
73. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (conscientious objectors perform-
ing alternative service excluded from veterans' educational benefits).
74. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963).
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than ad hoc determinations of eligibility.75
The danger is clear. A test with only one possible variable, the
"importance" of a governmental interest, is a brittle one. When
the Court is confronted with an interest which it presumes can be
furthered through no less restrictive alternative means, that inter-
est, almost by definition., must prevail. Religious interests of great
dignity then must be ignored. This result was reached in each of
the last two terms when interests essentially the same as those
previously protected under earlier tests by the Court were as-
serted and rejected.
V. APPLICATION OF THOMAS
One year after Thomas, 76 United States v. Lee 77 denied "pre-
cisely the same religious interests ' 78 that had prevailed in Yoder
v. Wisconsin. 79 In Lee, an Amish employer resisted both the So-
cial Security taxes imposed on himself and the withholding of his
Amish employee's Social Security contributions on the grounds
that such taxes burdened the scriptural requirement: "'[blut if
any provide not... for those of his own house he hath denied the
faith, and is worse than an infidel.' "80 The Chief Justice's opinion
for the Court acknowledged the existence of a burden on religion
in this case. The Amish religion believes that it is sinful not to
provide for their own elderly or needy, and prohibits the accept-
ance of benefits from and the contributions to the social security
system.8 1 Chief Justice Burger noted that there was no challenge
75. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (differential treatment of legiti-
mate and illegitimate offspring under Social Security Act); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (differential treatment of male and female members of
armed forces); see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719:
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the number of people
who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefits and
religious beliefs is large enough to create "widespread unemployment," or
even to seriously affect unemployment.. . . Nor is there any reason to be-
lieve that the number of people terminating employment for religious rea-
sons will be so great as to motivate employers to make such inquiries
[into religious beliefs].
Id. The Court did not consider the impact of this rule on the choice of other em-
ployees. This impact, for Dean Choper, is critical as an establishment clause mat-
ter. See Choper, supra note 34, at 690-96.
76. 450 U.S. 707.
77. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
78. Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
80. 455 U.S. at 255 n.3 (quoting from 1 Timothy 5:8).
81. Id.
to the sincerity of the belief and that there was no judicial role in
determining whether the religionists' interpretation of the Amish
faith was the proper one.82 This forced the conclusion that "com-
pulsory participation in the social security system interferes with
their free exercise rights."83 Thus, under the Thomas least re-
strictive alternative test, the only question remaining was
whether the compulsory participation was "essential to accom-
plish an overriding governmental interest."84
At this point, instead of expressly placing the burden on the
government to "justify an inroad on religious liberty,"85 the Chief
Justice implicitly engaged in the very deferential approach of the
Sunday Closing Law Cases. 86 However, this deference was only
to the importance of mandatory participation and the administra-
tive difficulties in granting exemptions87 and did not consider the
degree of the burden on the Amish. The opinion quotes from the
Senate report to the effect that voluntary coverage would under-
mine the soundness of the system.88 The report, however, was
not Congress' final word on the subject inasmuch as it provided
for exactly the exemption sought by Lee, but limited it to the self-
employed.89 In Lee, therefore, the Chief Justice was willing to
suppose a harm to the social security system. In Thomas, how-
ever, he presumed the absence of any harm to the Indiana Unem-
ployment Compensation system by placing the burden of
82. Id. at 257 (" '[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.'" (quot-
ing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716)).
83. 455 U.S. at 257. Obviously, like the Jewish merchants in Braunfeld, or the
Jehovah's Witnesses in Sherbert and Thomas, the pursuit of the dictates of their
religions forces them to forego certain financial benefits.
84. 455 U.S. at 257-58.
85. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
86. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599'(1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 14-16 and ac-
companying text.
87. The performance of the Court on this Thomas least restrictive alternative
test is at best pathetic. Justice Stevens says simply, "[t]hus, if we confine the
analysis to the Government's interest in rejecting the particular claim to an ex-
emption at stake in this case, the constitutional standard as formulated by the
Court has not been met." Lee, 455 U.S. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring). He con-
curred, however, because he rejected the Thomas test. Id. at 263. "In my opinion,
it is the objector who must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that there is a
unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a valid law of general
applicability." Id. at 262.
88. Id. at 258.
89. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1976). One could conclude that the government's
interest is not that critical. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. The
opinion simply asserts that, "[s]elf-employed persons in a religious community
having its own 'welfare' system are distinguishable from the generality of wage
earners employed by others." Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. It does not tell us why thisfac-
tual distinction is legally significant.
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justification on the state.90
Most recently, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 91 the
same deference to the importance of policy choices, without con-
sideration of the impact on religion, characterized the Court's ap-
plication of the Thomas least restrictive alternative test. Through
Chief Justice Burger, the Court upheld a burden on religious
schools and the individual's choice of a religious education for
one's children. Again, a religious interest previously protected
through a different test counted little in the constitutional analy-
sis under the "liberal" test.9 2
Two schools were involved. The first, Bob Jones University, is a
religious and educational institution dedicated to the teaching
and propagation of "fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs."93
It requires its teachers to be devout Christians and to teach all
courses "according to the Bible."94 Entering students are
screened according to their religious beliefs and their private con-
duct is strictly regulated, including prohibitions on interracial dat-
ing and marriage which the sponsors of the University "genuinely
believe" is forbidden by the Bible.95 The second, Goldsboro
Christian Schools, offers classes from kindergarten through high
school in satisfaction of state compulsory education require-
ments. Its Biblical view that cultural or biological mixing of the
races is a violation of God's command leads it to maintain a ra-
cially discriminatory admissions policy.96
The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) determined that institu-
tions which practice racial discrimination were not entitled to cer-
tain tax benefits.9 7 After concluding that the I.R.S. correctly
interpreted the statutes, the Court turned to the constitutional is-
sue-whether that tax policy could be applied to schools that ad-
vance a sincerely held religious belief as a reason for engaging in
90. 455 U.S. 252, 256-58 (1982).
91. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
92. Id. at 2035. But see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2022.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2023-24.
97. In particular, such institutions were no longer deemed eligible for an ex-
emption from unemployment taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976) and contri-
butions to them were not deemed deductible as charitable contributions under 26
U.S.C. § 170(a) (1976).
a particular practice, here racial discrimination, that is burdened
by statute.
The entire constitutional analysis is contained in a single four-
sentence paragraph with which no member of the Court took is-
sue. Consistent with practice under the least restrictive alterna-
tive test, the Court assumed that the sincerely held beliefs were
religious. 98 The second prong needed no elaborate discussion in
finding a burden since "[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably
have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious
schools.... ."99 Thus, the critical third prong was approached-
whether the compelling government interest could not be accom-
modated through less restrictive means.
The first of the four sentences states, "[tihe governmental in-
terest at stake here is compelling." 0 0 The Court attempts to bol-
ster this assertion by adding the second sentence: "As discussed
[above],1i011 the Government has a fundamental overriding inter-
est in eradicating racial discrimination in education[1021--discrim-
ination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years
98. 103 S. Ct. at 2034 & n.28; see also supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 2035 (emphasis added); see supra notes 65-68 and accompany-
ing text. The Court did observe that the denial 'wifl not prevent those schools
from observing their religious tenets." 103 S. Ct. at 2035 (emphasis added). How-
ever, this is true of any indirect burden case, financial or otherwise.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2035. As noted previously, the question of whether a govern-
mental interest is "important" has been problematic and without apparent judicial
standards. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. It might be argued that
the Court should be more inclined to defer to the judgment, of Congress, a co-
equal branch, when the issue involves a federal statute rather than a state statute.
With regard to this point in benign discrimination cases, see Seeburger, A Heuris-
tic Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. Prrr. L REv. 285, 299-304
(1977); accord Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion uphold-
ing requirement that 10 percent of funds under Public Works Employment Act of
1977 be set aside for minority contractors). That argument, however, is at its
weakest here since the first amendment, by its express terms, is a limit only on
Congress.
101. The focus of the discussion was whether the I.R.S. correctly interpreted
the statutes giving tax benefits.
102. 103 S. Ct. at 2035 (footnote added). The Court added a footnote making
two points. Id. at n.29. First, the subject matter of the regulation was schools, not
churches. This point would be clearer if the relevant issue under the Thomas test
was the degree of burden rather than the importance of the governmental interest.
It is further obscured by the second point in the footnote, a reference to Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), which had invalidated the state distribution of
textbooks to racially discriminatory schools. The Bob Jones University situation,
however, involved a private action and was not within the reach of the fourteenth
amendment. Norwood, which did not address private discrinination, is relevant
only if the denial of the tax exemption is constitutionally compelled. The federal
government has expressed this in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976) (right to contract without private racial discrimination includes
right to enroll in private schools); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment in private schools reachable
through the commerce clause); and Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1982) (prohibit-
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of this Nation's history."1 0 3 The next sentence, dealing with the
actual application of the Thomas test,104 seems terribly out of
place. "That governmental interest substantially outweighs
whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exer-
cise of their religious beliefs.105
It is only the fourth and last sentence that, given the lack of
controversy over the sincerity of the belief, its religious nature,
the fact of a burden, and the existence of an important govern-
mental interest, purports to dispose of the constitutional question.
That sentence in its entirety reads: "The interests asserted by pe-
titioners cannot be accommodated with that compelling govern-
mental interest, see United States v. Lee; and no 'less restrictive
means,' see Thomas v. Review Board; are available to achieve the
governmental interest."106
This statement can be self-evident (and thus require no elabo-
ration) only where the religious practice itself is prohibited by the
governmental regulation, as opposed to being indirectly burdened
or made financially more difficult to observe. The former was the
case here. The government's policy is to eradicate segregation in
(private)107 education.1 08 Thus, the government policy always
ing programmatic discrimination where federal funds are received through the
spending power).
103. 103 S. Ct. at 2035.
104. "The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest." Thomas,
450 U.S. at 718.
105. 103 S. Ct. at 2035. As with the footnote to the prior sentence, see supra
note 102, this seems to have relevance only to a balancing test which would take
into account the degree of the burden. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying
text. Under such a test, Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian
Schools might be treated differently. See infra quote from Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1972), note 108.
106. 103 S. Ct. at 2035 (citations and footnote omitted). The Court added a foot-
note rejecting Bob Jones University's establishment clause claim that denial of the
exemption favors religions that do not require racial discrimination over those
that do. Id. at n.30.
107. See supra note 102.
108. It is difficult to see the practices of Bob Jones University and the Golds-
boro Christian Schools as interfering with that policy in the same way. Bob Jones
University does not involve compulsory education at the primary and secondary
levels. Contra Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1972). Chief Justice Bur-
ger, in a plurality opinion, upholding state aid to church-related colleges against
an establishment clause challenge stated: 'There are generally significant differ-
ences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learn-
ing and parochial elementary and secondary schools. The 'affirmative if not
dominant policy' of the instruction in pre-college church schools is 'to assure fu-
ture adherence to a particular faith by having control of their total education at an
prevails against a religious claim when the practice is directly
burdened. The application of the Thomas test to the direct bur-
den case is no less mindless than the belief/action distinction' 09
and produces the same result-no special protection for religious
practices."0
VI. THE BENEFITS OF BALANCING
Unless there is some evaluation of the degree of the burden and
the importance of the practice, weighed against the strength of
the government's claim, the free exercise clause will have mean-
ing only where there is an indirect and often trivial burden. The
free exercise clause will receive only minimal recognition where a
practice is directly prohibited. While the least restrictive alterna-
tive test might have value in the case of an indirect burden, it is
inappropriate when examining direct burdens. The same stan-
dard of review does not work for both the case where an individ-
ual's religious beliefs cause him to forego a public benefit coupled
with a strong government policy for the denial, and the case
where a religious practice is prohibited by a general regulation ac-
companied by a relatively weak governmental policy. Eventually,
any religious claim will fall against the government's interest
where there is no express consideration of the importance of the
interest or the degree of the burden.
Different results which are more protective of religious inter-
ests might have been obtained if the Thomas least restrictive al-
ternative test had not been used exclusively. The availability of
alternative means, such as an exemption, could be an important
and often determinative component of such a test. Although such
a balancing test would not cast the burden on the government,
the consideration of alternative means in conjunction with the rel-
ative importance of the interest asserted could hardly be less crit-
ical of governmental interests than was the case in Lee " or Bob
Jones University. 112 Additionally, such a test would be sensitive
to the degree of the burden and the importance of the religious
practice, which the Thomas test ignores.
early age.'... [Clollege students are less susceptible to religious indoctrination."
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). Additionally, Bob Jones University did not
prevent blacks from enrolling; rather it prevented all students from interracial dat-
ing and marriage. The Court correctly pointed out that the states may not prevent
miscegenation. The Court, however, failed to attempt to identify a federal policy
in favor of it, as it did with desegregated education. 103 S. Ct. at 2017.
109. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). For discussion of Reyn-
olds, see supra note 8.
110. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
111. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
112. 103 S. Ct. at 2017.
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In Bob Jones University, the two schools could have been
treated differently. The availability of alternative means is clear.
The I.R.S. routinely deals with tax exemptions involving charita-
ble institutions. Since the case involved private institutions, the
governmental interest in desegregation, while nonetheless sub-
stantial, is not as strong as the Court would have the reader be-
lieve. Similarly, the importance to religion on controlling
education is not the same in the primary and secondary schools
as at the college level. Similarly, the governmental interest is not
the same when dealing with schools subject to compulsory educa-
tion laws compared with an undergraduate schools' interracial
dating policy. Clearly, the burden on the religious interest of the
Goldsboro Christian Schools was significantly greater, whereas
the governmental interest in Bob Jones University was less
demanding.
By the same token, Lee and Thomas are difficult to reconcile.
In Lee, the government had already provided a similar exemption
for religious reasons to other members of the Amish faith. On the
other hand, no previously existing exemptions were present in
Thomas. Therefore, the governmental interest and the availabil-
ity of alternative means are quite different in the two cases. Simi-
larly, the importance and degree of burdens are different. Lee
involved a tax on a recognized group. Thomas involved the with-
holding of a benefit to an idiosyncratic individual. If there are to
be different results in these cases, each should have been decided
the other way.
VII. CONCLUSION
Protection of religious interests requires the abandonment of a
universal or exclusive Thomas test. When the Court concludes
that there is no less restrictive alternative available, it should not
thereupon automatically uphold the burden on the practice.
Rather, the Court should proceed to do something more difficult-
to carefully identify and evaluate all the relevant competing inter-
ests. Such an approach, a balancing test, has room for some sen-
sitivity, judgment, and intelligence. 1 3
113. See Freund, A Picture of Law as Creation, HARv. LAW SCHOOL BULL.,
Summer 1976, at 6:
In a larger sense all law resembles art, for the mission of each is to impose
a measure of order on this disorder of experience without stifling the un-
derlying diversity, spontaneity and disarray. New vistas open in art as in
law. In neither will the craftsman succeed unless he sees that proportion
and balance are both virtues when held in a proper tension. The new vis-
tas give a false light unless there are cross-lights. There are, I am afraid,
no absolutes in law or art except intelligence.
Id.
